Abstract-Service Oriented Architectures have been increasingly evaluated and applied within military networks. However, existing implementations tend to overlook the constraints of the tactical environment, generating unsuitable requirements of network resources. The ongoing TACTICS project aims to study these constraints and propose solutions suitably adjusted to the tactical ecosystem. Under this scope, the implementation of security architectures presents significant challenges and limitations. In this article we analyse the constraints of tactical SoA over the entire mission life cycle and derive a set of fine granularity security requirements, such that a security policy mechanism may optimally adjust to dynamic network conditions. Furthermore, we present the requisite characteristics of the developed security mechanisms, which are crucial for the real-time computation of policy decisions based on current situational knowledge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Current tactical infrastructures comprise of contemporary C2 (Command and Control) and C4I (Command, Control, Communication, Computers and Intelligence) systems of increasing complexity and heterogeneity. Yet, the transition towards NEC (Network Enabled Capability) [1] and NCW (Network Centric Warfare) [2] , [3] [4] , promoted the adaptation of SOA for the achievement of the required operational flexibility and dynamic adaptation, maintaining consistent transactions and information exchanges. Service oriented architectures provide established standards for applications over classical business environments. Yet, the applicability over constraint wireless networks requires the establishment of suitable adaptation mechanisms.
Undertaken research across the fields of military operations [5] [6] [7] , SOA [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] and security policy standards [13] [14] [15] [16] , promoted the applicability of the SOA paradigm across the strategic domain, with applications also, to limited extend, into the tactical domain. Yet, the existing NATO C3 System Architecture Frameworks [17] , focuses primarily on the strategic command echelons, without considering the various constraints imposed by the nature of the tactical environment (e.g. disruptions, mobility, congested or restricted networks). Furthermore, The German project RuDi, under the scope of security, aims to define protection services and applications, but does not consider functional constraints critical for the applicability of such architectures within the tactical domain, such as storage and computational limitations. Finally, the international project CoNSIS aims to improve existing ESB (Enterprise Service Bus) mechanisms within rapidly evolving networks, without utilizing state of the art implementations for the definition of security policies with the use of ontological constructs.
The TACTICS project refers to an ongoing work, planned to be carried on until 2017. The security related aspects of the project include:
• Monitor and advice on security related aspects and requirements.
• Security of cross-layer network capabilities.
• Investigation of secure protocols and algorithms for robust distributed service storage, retrieval, and discovery.
• Investigation of secure, efficient and robust overlay routing with the incorporation of cross-layer information.
• Identification of lightweight and dynamic protection mechanisms.
• Identification of suitable information filtering, classification and provenance assurance mechanisms.
• Analysis and definition of robust and adaptable security policies for tactical SOA Within this context [18] , in our earlier studies, the constraints, functional requirements and formalization of ontologically defined security policies have been identified [19] , followed by the analysis of corresponding distribution [20] and reconciliation mechanisms [21] . In this article our initial findings regarding the constraints and protection requirements of tactical SOA are identified. Furthermore, the operational modes of the implemented security mechanisms are presented and analysed in conjunction with the required elements of policy design.
II. CONSTRAINTS OF THE TACTICAL ENVIRONMENT
Tactical networks have characteristics similar to Ad-Hoc and mesh networks, with additional constraints and requirements due to their military oriented nature. Increased information exchanges and intra/inter node invocations, follow patterns dictated by mission specific requirements, tasks and phases. Yet, scarcity of resources and external parameters (e.g. environmental conditions, terrain, adversarial activities) impose sources of significant impact to the network performance and quality of service. The identified constraints can be categorised as terminal or network oriented.
Tactical terminals are of significant dissimilarity regarding both the serving platforms and their technical capabilities, extending to hand-held devices or sensors. Network performance and quality of service can be affected by terminal limitations referring to: resources (e.g. bandwidth, frequencies), protocols, and radio characteristics (e.g. packet error rate, jitter, delay) • Application layer: Due to service delivery, discovery and registry management. The challenge for securing tactical SOA rises by meeting the required protection goals (Section III), under the specific constraints and requirements of the tactical environment. Thus, suitable security policies must be designed and dynamically adapted to the environmental conditions, the characteristics of the protected services and the existing QoS requirements or capabilities. [22] .
Two distinct communication infrastructures are defined within the ecosystem of military communication networks. Standard SOA architectures can be utilised for the overprovisioned strategic domain, while the constrained nature of the tactical domain requires the use of distributed SOA. The strategic domain can provide continuous connectivity with the use of stable network infrastructure, while the tactical domain can only be assumed to offer intermittent and opportunistic connectivity through Disruption Tolerant Networks (DTN). Due to these constraints the realization of security mechanisms within the tactical domain requires the adaptation of distributed SOA. Thus, the tactical domain requires the suitable exploitation of resources, in the limited time-frames where sufficient connectivity is available, in order to check, deploy or update the security mechanisms. A tactical operation is divided in the following phases: 1) Mission preparation: Executed at the strategic domain, prior to the operation, with no resource limitations. At this stage the security mechanisms will have no significant limitations on autonomy and processing power. 2) Mission execution: It is executed at the tactical domain and demands the periodic dynamic adaptation of the security functionalities over the current networks conditions. At this stage node mobility, intermittent connectivity, dynamic topologies and the node functional characteristics require disruption tolerant functionality of the deployed security mechanisms, maintaining consistency and autonomy.
3) Mission debrief: Executed at the strategic domain after the tactical operation, in order to synchronize, analyse and compile the operation reports and logs. Within these stages the required security goals will have distinct levels of criticality, due to the dissimilar constraints and requirements of the strategic and tactical domains. Through the mission execution stage, where tactical SOA are deployed, two modes of operation are defined. Continuous connectivity refers to a state where the defined service provider and the corresponding clients, retain sufficient connectivity for a time frame sufficient for the execution of a particular service/ functionality. In a tactical network, nodes can maintain continuous connectivity when stationary and near communication infrastructure or while moving in a predicable manner, such as a convoy formation. In these scenarios the security infrastructure can utilize semi-centralized approaches in order to deploy and enforce policies, where the policy enforcement and decision points are assigned to the most suitable available node, based on a on-line evaluation of network resources and conditions, for a long period across the mission life-cycle.
Degraded operation occurs when network performance is compromised due to excessive resource consumption, physical barriers, malfunctioning equipment, active attacks or mission specific functionalities. A network is considered to operate under degraded status, when some of the required performance parameters falls out of the desirable and predefined limits. Such parameters may refer to connectivity, affecting the network's QoS or service availability. For example, a service may partially fail when a set of sub-services cannot be reached or executed. In this case, the service can still be invoked and accessed. Yet, it cannot provide the full set of required functionalities. Thus, degraded status refers to a state between continuous connectivity and disrupted communication, causing longer delays due to packet loss, errors or disruptions. For that purpose, the deployed security policies must respond and dynamically adapt to the environmental conditions, but also support standalone and connectivity island operation. This can be achieved by the distribution of dynamically adaptable security policies, across the deployed actors, based on the evaluation of their capabilities and mission requirements. Although mere replication is not sufficient, the main assumption of distributed security architectures is creating redundancy by having copies of access control mechanisms and policy databases on multiple nodes. Furthermore, the utilization of utility functions (e.g. mobility patterns, history of past encounters, social node characteristics) and the on-line evaluation of dynamic network attributes, can provide sufficient dynamism and adaptation of the security infrastructure, in order to maintain support of the defined security goals under degraded operation. Three types of degraded operation can be identified, namely: 1) Isolated: The node is disconnected from the networks and can only make use of local services. Thus, core and coalition services are unreachable. 2) Fragmented: The network is partitioned and the nodes reorganized. Core and coalition services can be available and opportunistic connections possible. 3) Is-landed: The network is operational without connection with the strategic domain.
III. IDENTIFIED SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
Protecting tactical SOA requires the realization of generic protection goals, similar to those found in other systems, such as:
Yet, the unique constraints and additional, or even mutually conflicting objectives, call for the establishment of robust and flexible multilayer security mechanisms. Furthermore, the prioritization of these goals must be dynamically adjusted over time to the specifics of each tactical operation. Thus, the realized security mechanisms must distinguish different components and phases of the tactical operation, by explicitly referring to information, communication, data at rest and processing. This classification allows the explicit protection of stored and transmitted information, in addition to the communication and processing as distinct assets of the tactical environment, within the inherently dynamic nature of SOA [23] [24] . These additional requirements, classified according to the aforementioned domains, are: 1) Information a) Information life cycle: Both information and processing mechanisms must be subjected to life cycle models, including mechanisms for purging a datum from a device. Furthermore, in the case of encrypted information, this protection goal can be transformed into a key management problem, regarding the requirement for key storage and deletion, in order to ensure that no useful information can be retained. b) Coalition environment considerations: The implemented security mechanisms must be able to add and remove entities across distinct trust layers. It can be applied on a per-mission basis, with the use of statistical or dynamic mapping. c) Filtering: Information filtering mechanisms must be available within the security architecture, providing that information are subjected to suitable transformations, rendering them suitable for the expected set of recipients. d) Environmental constraints: Information must be associated to ancillary attributes, regarding the circumstances it was processed or generated. This protection goal is required for the support of previously established requirements, such as authenticity, provenance and traceability. e) Supporting information: Security policy decisions can be efficiently refined by the use of extended supporting information, which may arise from a variety of sources. Such information can be used for the validation, invalidation and corroboration of assertions and assumptions regarding the state of the tactical network. 2) Communication a) Channel utilisation minimisation: Communications must minimise both the frequency and duration of information transmissions and requests. The purpose of this protection goal is focused on efficiency consid-erations, such as spectrum utilization and energy consumption. Furthermore, mission specific requirements are supported, such as EMCON (Emission Control) or constraint emission that prevents adversaries from gathering COMINT (Communication Intelligence) and ELINT (Electronic Signal Intelligence). b) Channel utilization equalization: Channel utilisation should be equalised over time. This protection goal also prevents COMINT/ELINT activities either on the communication protocol level or on higher, mission specific, levels. c) Channel reliability: A reliability metric must be provided mirroring the channels ability for message transmission. On the utilised multi-hop protocols, non reliable channels, bandwidth constraints and delays can prevent operations from completing with the required quality of service parameters. The relevant characteristics will not necessarily be measurable or guaranteed in advance and must hence be estimated, where historical measurements are available. d) Isolation policy: Isolated nodes must have an explicit policy in place for handling prolonged isolation from the mission network. Additionally, seeking to enforce re-establishment of communication links may leak COMINT/ELINT and locality information. Thus, full isolation must be supported, including cases where reliable destruction of locally held cryptographic material is required. e) Route information and preference: Communication channels must allow property recovery and constraint expressions. This protection goal aims to allow channel selection based on threat analysis and QoS intelligence. f) Security service resource provisioning: The communication requirements for provisioning security services must inform minimum service level requirements, including contingency plans where these cannot be met. g) Trust anchor: Nodes in a network must be equipped with a known good trust anchor for establishing communication with other nodes. 3) Data at rest a) Mission Life Cycle Support of Security Mechanisms: Each processing unit must be capable of capturing mission parameters and modifying its behaviour according to the current state of the mission life-cycle. 4) Processing a) Processing Integrity: Every processing unit must be capable of validating the integrity and authenticity of all code to be executed, by the use of appropriate assurance mechanisms. b) Trustworthy initialization: Processing initialization must be supported by robust security mechanisms, for the validation of the processing node itself. c) Dynamic Processing Integrity: Every processing unit must be capable of monitoring its own process integrity and to take mitigating measures on detection, by the use of control flow and data flow analysis mechanisms. d) Security Service Assurance: Where security services are provided in an aggregate or layered form, the assurance offered by the aggregating service is necessarily the lowest offered by the constituent elements.
IV. ELEMENTS OF POLICY DESIGN
Security policies can be enriched with available cross layer information and meta-data regarding the operating status of various network elements, as presented at figure 4. Incorporating such information, can provide a refined security policy the decisions of which fulfil the defined security goals, while at the same time remain adaptable to the local and environmental conditions. In order to maintain the purity of the security policy, such cross layer information can be implemented with the use of ontological structures, and be categorised regarding their source and scope as: 1) Service domain: A tactical network must be able to provide some compulsory capabilities, including shared situational awareness, management of effects and fire support. This domain includes information, descriptive of the provided services. Service description may include static elements such as service type, classification or the quality of the required input. On the contrary, the current status, possible providers or available service substitutions are some of the dynamic information, which can be utilised. 2) Information domain: The information generated by the users, services and infrastructure are of broad dissimilarity. These blocks of information differ in various characteristics, such as the nature of the included element (alerts, orders, tactical information), their source/ destination, type (data, voice, chat, signalling), size, generation frequency or their required quality, reliability and security features. 3) Network domain: This domain includes information used to form an understanding over the evolving topology of the network, including various topographic, social and mobility parameters. Some static information can be identified within this domain, such as the operational group that a node/ individual belongs too. Yet, since tactical networks consist of a highly versatile combination of ad-hoc and mesh networks, a wide variety of dynamic information may be incorporated, including a list of neighbouring nodes, the current location and the history of past encounters. 4) Radio domain: There is a wide variety of suitable radios for use within the tactical environment, including UHF, VHF, WLAN and SatCom communication. The availability of such capabilities at any time within the lifetime of an operation, is crucial regarding network connectivity and service selection/ availability. The information which can be obtained may be static, such as the used band, Tx power and range, or highly dynamic such as available bandwidth. Additionally, monitoring of such radio information can be used, in order to achieve identification of active/passive attacks and intrusion detection, leading to policy decisions of enhanced security. 5) Node domain: The involved assets within a tactical operation are of high heterogeneity. Thus, the used equipment is of high diversity with variable abilities and characteristics. This domain includes multiple static, such as the device code name, available communication protocols or available security mechanisms, and dynamic information, such as active operational feature (normal, low detection, low interception, anti-jam), trust level, resource availability and mobility history. 6) Subject domain: Additionally to the previously described information, each of the individuals that constitute a tactical group, has specific characteristics which determine the range of actions that can be undertaken within the network. The available information regarding each subject can include the rank, an identification, the current operational group and the overall role within the group. Thus, each tactical node maintains a transmitter and a receiver status in respect to the security policy, which comprise of the aforementioned static and dynamic cross-layer information. Concurrently a communication session between two nodes may require the evaluation of attributes across all the domains, while in SOA implementation the intermediate nodes may actively participate in the data manipulation and service execution, as presented in figure 5 . Such scenarios occur in SOA implementations, since a resource request can be served by one or many service providers. Thus, a service invocation can be distributed and served by multiple entities, in a variety of scenarios such as loops, direct links or fan out. Furthermore, mission specific requirements, resource constraints or environmental parameters may require the acquisition of immediate policy decisions in contrasts to the accuracy of the conditions that these decisions are based on. Such cases may include priority tactical alerts or messages with flash precedence. Thus, dedicated policy branches must be implemented, in order to dictate how these cases are treated by the security mechanisms.
Incorporating the aforementioned elements a tactical security policy must represent and govern the interactions of entities across the distributed tactical ecosystem, achieving the realisation of the identified security goals. Thus, the security mechanisms must be able to gather information across various domains regarding the system's state and instantiate the security policy, which concurrently makes use of rich semantics in order to achieve the required functionalities. The required functionalities are supported by the identified security goals and have been categorised as: 1) Planning: It includes procedures that support the functionality of security mechanisms during the preparation phase of a tactical operation (e.g. pre-shared keys and inter-domain tuning for Communities Of Interest) 2) Protection: It includes tasks that actively imped undesirable activities that may compromise assets or disclose sensitive information (e.g. access control, information labelling and service security) 3) Detection: It includes rules in order to identify undesirable activities (e.g. cyber-attacks); 4) Diligence: It includes proactive measures to update the security mechanisms and policies (e.g. policy reconciliation or policy update); 5) Response: It includes processes that address violations after they have been detected (e.g. add services and nodes to a black list). These internal policy functionalities may have different ways to implement their purposes across the various supported capabilities. Yet, the realization of robust but flexible governing rules, with the incorporation of dynamic cross-layer information, can provide the required on-line adaptation of the security mechanisms into the specifics of the occurring environmental alterations across a tactical operation.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Securing tactical SOA requires the realization of demanding protection requirements, for stored, transmitted and processed information. The implemented mechanisms for the realization of the defined requirements, must be able to support the identified functionalities under the constraints of the tactical environment, maintaining operability within the various tactical modes of operation. This can be achieved with the incorporation and on-line evaluation of existing cross-layer information, across the various network domains, within semantically enriched security policies. Concurrently, the defined security policies can dynamically adapt to the network alterations, adjusting the functionality of the security mechanism to the network attributes. The results of our studies presented in this article form the basis for our future work on the security of tactical SOA, within the scope of the ongoing project TACTICS. 
